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RECENT DECISIONS
Dean Milk Co. et al v. City of Chicago et al, 53 N. E. 2nd. January 20,
1944.
This is an appeal from a judgment in the circuit court of Cook County in which a permanent writ of injunction was issued restraining the
City of Chicago and its officers from interfering with plaintiffs in the
sale of milk or milk products in quantities less than one gallon in single
service containers. The issue involves the construction and validity of a
provision in the milk ordinance of the City of Chicago.
The provision over which the issue has arisen is Section 154-15 of
the Municipal Code which provides that:
"Any milk or milk products sold in quantities of less than one gallon
shall be delivered in standard milk bottles....1'
The Defendant City contends that the true construction of this provision is that such containers must be glass milk bottles. The Plaintiff
Dairy contends that the single service paper container in which they
sell milk is a "standard milk bottle" within the meaning of the ordinance.
They further contend that whatever power the city may have had to
prohibit the sale of milk in such containers was taken away by the
Illinois Milk Pasteurization Plant Act of 1939 and also that if the'ordinance were construed to prohibit the use of single service paper containers it would be unreasonable and therefore void.
The court here fiist went into a discussion of the rules to guide the
court in the construction of an ordinance. The court cites the case of
Dwight v. Chicago Railways Co.,1 in which another Illinois court went
into a lengthy discussion of the question and summed up the rule to be:
"The rules for the construction of an ordinance are the same as those
applied in the construction of a statute." The rule further states.
as has been stated in many other cases 2 is that as in the case of
statutes, the primary rule for the interpretation and construction of
ordinances is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the lawmaking body. The court further said that the intention of the lawmaking
body is to be determined by the time and under the circumstances existing at the time the ordinance was passed.3
The question presented here is the meaning of the phrase "in standard milk bottles" and what the city council intended to include within
that term when the ordinance was passed in 1935. The court discussed
the origin of the milk bottle from 1884 until the present time. It stated
that a milk bottle used today is similar-to the first one used. The size
and shape of a milk bottle is well known to every ordinary person. The
1 Dwight V. Chicago Railway Co. 270 IIl. 87; 110 N. E. 386 (1915).
2 People v. Price, 257 I1. 587; 101 N. E. 198 (1913).
3 People ex rel Fyfi v. Barne-t. 319 Il. 403; 150 N. E. 290 (1925).
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court said that the phrase meant a glass bottle of a certain size and
shape. Since the use of paper containers was unheard of at the time the
ordinance was passed the court said it could not have been included in
the contemplation of the city council when it passed the ordinance.
The next point argued and discussed was that of the state law which
the milk company claimed abridged the city ordinance. This law was
passed in 1939 and provided that: "all multi-use containers and equipment with which milk or milk products came in contact shall be constructed in such manner as to be easily cleaned and kept in good repair.
Single service containers, caps, gaskets and similar articles shall be manufa:ctured in a like manner."4 There was a saving clause in this same
Act however, which provided that the foregoing statements shall not
impair or abridge the power of the city to regulate the handling of milk.
The majority of the court in this case held that because of this saving
clause, the city still has the right to prohibit the use of the self-service
paper containers for the sale of milk or milk products. The fullest meaning that can be given to this act of legislature, the court said, is to say
that if the city were to permit the sale of milk in such paper containers
that they must be manufactured in a sanitary manner.
The plaintiffs further contended that if they were forbidden to use
the paper containers that such a prohibition would be unreasonable and
therefore void. The court went into the evidence presented as to the
relative merits of the paper and the glass containers and decided that
since there was a possibility that the milk might be or become injured
while in such paper containers that such an order prohibiting their use
would not be unreasonable. The conclusion of the majority of the court
was therefore that the city could, under the ordinance, prohibit the use
of paper containers for the sale of milk or milk products in quantities
of less than one gallon.
To this decision there were three dissenters. The dissenting opinion
which was written by Stone, is in my opinion, the more reasonable and
logical. The dissenting opinion pointed out that according to the best
authorities the definition of a bottle is "a vessel for holding, carrying
or pouring liquids," also as a "hollow mouthed vessel of glass, wood,
leather or other material for carrying liquids." They insist that since
the term "standard milk bottles" was not defined in the ordinance that
the court should take these well known authorities as their guide. It
cannot be assumed that the omission of the definition was an accident or
that the city council did not intend that perhaps sometime something
other than a glass bottle might be used to carry milk. Since the council
did not limit the ordinance to glass bottles, as it could easeily have done,
it should be interpreted to mean also the paper self-service containers.
This seems to be a much more reasonable view to take under these circumstances.
-- James J. Kane.
4 I1. Rev State 1941, Chapter 56%, Section 15, Item 10.
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Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Hunt. (A Review) 88 L. Ed 161.
The Magnolia Co., petitioner, employed the respondent in Louisiana
as a laborer. During the course of his employment, Hunt 'went over to
Texas and while working there for the oil company, which was authorized to do business in Louisiana as well as Texas, was injured by a falling drill stem. He sought and received an award from the insurer under
the Workmen's Compensation Law of Texas, and such award was considered final by Texas courts. Next, the respondent brought a suit
against the oil company in Louisiana seeking further award under the
Louisiana Compensation law, and the courts of that state gave him the
difference between his Texas award and the higher amount offered in
Louisiana. The Magnolia Company now brings certiorari from the highest court in the land after the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the
award of its lower court. The question is that of full faith and credit
under Art. VI, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
Under Texas statutes, an employee having received an award in
another state can not receive further compensation in its courts. Louisiana conceding that Texas had jurisdiction to award the compensation,
nevertheless felt that it could give force to its own compensatory statutes
without violating full faith and credit in an action of an employee
against his employer. Here the court cites the Williams v. North Carolina case in which full faith and credit received credit and parallels its
precepts with those in this case regarding the constitutional topic.
Chief Justice Stone says that while the court has held that the state of
the employer and the employee is free to apply its own law even if the
injury happened in another state, and also that the state where the injury took place is likewise free to apply its statute despite the fact that
the employer and employee are of another state, this does not mean that
after recovery by an employee in the state of his injury he may go to
the state of his domicile and recover further award under its law. Considering an award of this nature on the footing with a judgment of any
court and merely statutory, full faith and credit is demanded.
The Chief Justice cites many cases to substantiate the following
statements: "From the beginning this Court has held that these provisions have made that which has been adjudicated in one state res judicata to the same extent in every other." Milwaukee Co. v. M. E. White
Co., 80 L. ed. 220; Davis v. Davis, 83 L. ed. 26; and Williams v. North
Carolina, 87 L. ed. 279. That while the Constitution and statutes on the
matter are not all embracing and exceptions have been made to full faith
and credit, the. Court is the final arbiter as to what are exceptions:
"the actual exceptions have been few and far between ... ," Williams
case. supra. He states that the court is not aware of any exception in a
money judgment rendered in a civil action, and cites the case of Milwaukee Co. v. White Co. in which taxes adjudicated in one state are to be
affirmed under the full faith and credit clause in a sister state.
"Because there is a full faith and credit clause a defendant may not
a second time challenge the validity of the plaintiff's right which has
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ripened into judgment, and a plaintiff may not for his single cause of
action secure a second or a greater recovery." The court goes on to hold
falacious the contention of the Louisiana courts that because of Louisiana's recognized interest in the award, it should not have to give full
faith and credit. It states that Texas, where the injury occurred has a
like interest. Accordingly it maintains that no convincing reason had
been furthered whereby it could be found that Louisiana's interest was
greater, and contends that it certainly be no more of a difference than
North Carolina had in determining the marital status of several of its
citizens. Another contention which the court sweeps aside is that there
are two different suits or causes, and states: "The grounds of recovery
are the same in one state as in the other-the injury to the employee
in the course of his employment. The whole tendency of our decisions
under the full faith and credit clause is to require a plaintiff to try his
whole cause of action and his whole case at one time. He cannot split
up his claim and 'a fortiori, he cannot divide the grounds of recover.'
The respondent was free to pursue his remedy in either state, he chose
Texas to sue the insurer, and then Louisiana to sue the employer directly-this will not work according to Chief Justice Stone, etc.
Mr. Justice Jackson, upon whose shoulders fell the burden of deciding whether the Chief Justice was writing a dissent or a majority opinion, in view of Jackson's dissent in the Williams' case, failed to uphold
the traditional "gumption" which characterized the court's members of
days gone by-Holmes, Cardozo, etc. He went along with the majority
for no other reason than the fact, that since the Williams case was the
rule, he would abide it until it was changed. He had the chance to change
the rule or modify it in regard to Workmen's compensation cases, yet
he chose to abide the former decision.
Mr. Justice Douglas who wrote the majority opinion in the Williams
case dissented in this case, seeing the evident difference in the two cases.
He states: "The command of the full faith and credit clause frequently
makes a reconciliation of the two interests impossible. The question in
each case is whether as a practical matter there is room for adjustment,
consistent with the requirements of full faith and credit." He cites the
Williams case and further says: "Such questions of status, i. e., marital
capacity, involve conflicts between the policies of two States which are
quite irreconcilable as compared with the present situation." He points
out that if certain defenses had barred recovery for the employee under
Texas law, it would not disallow his going into a Louisiana court and
recovering .inder statutes not recognizing such defenses. He therefore
contends that it is no different where further recovery is asked over
and above another state's award; that the adjudications are as final in
either type case; and finally that the statutes of the two states do not
happen to be mutually exclusive in this case.
He goes on to point out the difference in the causes. One was in regard to compensation under the Employer's liability act of Texas, merely
on the compensation grounds, whereas the second suit in Louisiana was
one pursuant to the contractual relationship brought into existence in
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Louisiana between the employer and Hunt. The former discharged the
insurer of all claim. The Louisiana court does not claim to further
charge the insurer, but wants to reconcile the interests between employer and employee in the matter. The Louisiana contract makes the
interest of that state so much more in evidence than that of Texas, that
what Texas awarded and what the courts of Louisiana are attempting
to do are irreconcilable as to adjudication, and res judicata to the Texas
decree is not sound. Justice Black writes the dissent, whereas Douglas
concurred but dissented specially. The dissent of Douglas seems to put
in more concise form the fundamental reasons why the Williams case is
"no shelter in the present controversy."
-Wlliam Bodden.

